Praxamark™ simulationAnyone can copy your name and photo and post as you. Anyone can screenshot your post and change a word. And AI now writes in anyone's voice. A reader cannot tell what is yours.
A signature can. When Praxamark shares a post for you, it signs it with a key only your browser holds, and adds a line: ✓ Signed with Praxamark, with a link. A reader who follows the link sees a page that checks, in their own browser, who signed and that not a word has changed.
The pages the reader sees are Praxamark's own: the page a ✓ Signed link opens, and praxamark.com/verify, with their own checking code, real cryptography and test keys made for this visit. The people, organisation, websites and network are pretend. A signature shows who signed and that nothing changed; not that what it says is true.
Scene 1 of 4
You are Alex Morgan. Choose who you publish as, and let Praxamark sign your post and share it to Commons Social. Then play the reader: follow the link under the post, as anyone could.
Praxamark · ShareA simulated Praxamark share box. In Praxamark it is in the popup and on the bar.
In Praxamark today, a post is signed with your own key, and Publishing as carries your organisation's identifiers in the post. Signing with the organisation's own key, and with both (two signed records, two links), as simulated here, is coming.
What this shows: anyone can check your post, with Praxamark or without, in their own browser: who signed it, and that it is unchanged.
Scene 2 of 4
A copycat reposts your post with one word changed. They keep your ✓ Signed with Praxamark line, so it still looks like yours. A reader wonders: is this what Alex said?
What this shows: the link leads to the words Alex signed, and a copy that differs by one word is caught. A screenshot or a copy can’t borrow a signature.
Scene 3 of 4
An impostor opens a look-alike account and posts in your name. They can't use your key, which never leaves your browser, so they make one of their own, write your identifier on the record, and host its page on a site of their own.
What this shows: anyone can sign something. The page asks the real alex.example for its keys, and the impostor’s isn’t there. Only you can list keys on your own website.
Scene 4 of 4
Someone gets at your signed record where it is stored, on your website, and changes its words. They even recompute its fingerprint, so it looks consistent at a glance.
What this shows: the signature covers the whole record. Change a word and it no longer fits; without your key, nobody can make it fit again.
The end
Try it again as your organisation, or as both: go back to scene 1 and choose Publishing as.
Praxamark · on your deviceA simulated view of Praxamark's work. Your key never leaves your browser.
Simulated: in real life each signer’s own domain serves these files, and a reader’s browser fetches them from there.